Empirical Models of Debt-rescheduling with Sovereign Immunity by Avery, Robert B. & Fisher, Eric O\u27N.
Empirical models of debt­
rescheduling with sovereign 
immunity 
Robert B. Avery and Eric D'N. Fisher 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature on empirical 
models of debt-rescheduling in international financial markets. The 
discussion focuses primarily on the statistical techniques that have been 
developed. These fall into two areas: discriminant-analysis and prob­
abilistic-choice models. We also present other methods that might prove 
useful in future empirical research in this area. In particular, we discuss 
debt-rescheduling from the point of view of an explicitly dynamic 
economic analysis. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, we 
review the applied literature on international debt-rescheduling. We 
focus primarily on empirical studies and give only cursory discussion of 
the theoretical models ofdebt with sovereign risk. We also describe the 
common characteristics ofthe data that are used in these studies and give 
some of their sources. In the second section, we present summaries of the 
statistical techniques that have been used to determine the credit­
worthiness of the debtor countries. In the third section, we present a 
method of estimating debt-reschedulings as a dynamic program where 
the relevant control variable is a debtor country's decision to reschedule 
or not. This framework employs a forward-looking technique that has 
not yet been implemented in this literature. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
There are two excellent surveys of the literature on international debt­
rescheduling: McDonald (1982) and Solberg (1988). McDonald's survey 
discusses both theoretical and empirical issues. Because McDonald 
wrote at a relatively early date, his work suffers from the disadvantage of 
not including the recent theoretical literature applying game theory and 
 
information economics to debt-rescheduling. In his discussion of the 
empirical work, McDonald subdivides the work into studies employing 
discriminant analysis and logit analysis. Solberg employs a similar 
taxonomy but provides a more analytic discussion and a wider survey of 
the relevant empirical literature. 
Most of the empirical analyses of the determinants of debt­
rescheduling have been descriptive rather than derived from theoretical 
frameworks. This has not occurred because ofa lack ofgood theoretical 
models. For example, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) develop a particularly 
elegant theoretical model considered to be the seminal piece in this area. 
Kletzer (1984), Bulow and Rogoff (1987), Fernandez and Rosenthal 
(I990), and Hart and Moore (I989) also make noteworthy 
contributions. The theoretical literature focuses upon the fact that the 
decision to reschedule debt occurs in a dynamic framework. It also 
emphasizes the fact that debt contracts in situations in which sovereign 
immunity is a concern have to be self-enforcing. Because there are 
strategic elements in a debtor country's decision to reschedule, it is not 
true that a simple model of the supply and demand ofloanable funds is 
an accurate one. Indeed, much of the development of the theoretical 
literature in the last decade has consisted of incorporating increasingly 
sophisticated concepts from game theory and the economics of 
information into the applied analysis of debt contracts. 
The first systematic published empirical study of debt rescheduling 
was undertaken by Frank and Cline (1971). They use discriminant 
analysis to differentiate between countries that had rescheduled debt and 
those that had not. The fundamental unit ofanalysis was a country-year. 
They examined data from twenty-six countries over a period of nine 
years, but, because of problems with incompleteness of data, they were 
able to use only 145 country-years in their sample. In these data, there 
were thirteen reschedulings. Frank and Cline included eight different 
macro-economic variables in their analysis; they found that three of 
these had significant explanatory power in being able to discriminate 
between cases of rescheduling and cases of normal repayment. These 
three factors were the lagged ratio of the stock of debt to trend exports, 
the inverse of the maturity of a country's loans, and the ratio of a 
country's imports to its international reserves. 
A second important early empirical analysis is that of Feder and Just 
(1976). They were the first authors to use a logistic model of debt­
rescheduling. Again, the fundamental unit of analysis was the country­
year. Their sample included 238 country-years spanning 41 countries 
and eight years. They too encountered problems with incomplete data. 
In their sample there were 21 cases of rescheduling. They found six 
macro-economic variables that were statistically significant in 
explaining a country's likelihood of rescheduling debt. These were the 
ratio of imports to foreign-exchange reserves, the ratio of amortization 
to the stock of total debt, the ratio of debt-service payment to total 
exports, the rate ofgrowth ofexports, per capita income, and the ratio of 
capital inflows to debt-service payments. Feder and Just were the first 
authors to point out that there are some difficulties in defining exactly 
when an episode of debt-rescheduling has occurred. 
Fisk and Rimlinger (1979) conducted an analysis using precedent­
based non-parametric methods, similar to 'nearest neighbor' tech­
niques. Annual data on 49 countries from 1960 to 1975 were collected on 
ten factors believed to influence the choice to reschedule. They were: the 
ratio ofinternational reserves to imports; the debt-service ratio; the ratio 
of the IMF reserve position to imports; the ratio of exports to gross 
domestic product; the ratio of the stock of external debt to exports; the 
inflation rate; the ratio of imports to exports; the ratio of the stock of 
'supplier-disbursed debt' to the stock of external debt; the ratio of 
interest payments to the stock ofexternal debt, and the ratio of the stock 
of 'supplier-disbursed debt' to imports. The model was tested by 
selecting 90 sample observations at random and then determining how 
accurately a decision to reschedule could be predicted on the basis of the 
historical performance ofother countries with similar characteristics for 
the ten variables. Using a probability of one-half as a cutoff, the best 
Fisk-Rimlingermodel had an error rate of8 percent versus nineteen per 
cent for a naive model in which no countries were predicted to 
reschedule. 
Although Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) do not analyze the probability 
ofdebt-rescheduling directly, they do conduct an extensive examination 
of the underlying supply and demand equations for international debt. 
They argue that the rates ofreturn for international debt must be at least 
as great as that of alternative investments; that is, loans to 'risky' less 
developed countries must be larger than the market rate of interest on 
safe investments, Eaton and Gersovitz use a switching regression to 
distinguish between regimes of supply-constrained debt and demand­
determined debt for a sample of 45 countries during the years 1970 and 
1974. Their total sample included 82 country-years. Eaton and 
Gersovitz interpret variables that increase the quantity of debt in the 
supply-constrained regime as those that lower the likelihood of debt 
rescheduling. They show that increases in the variability in export 
revenues and increases in the ratio of imports to gross national product 
tend to increase the quantity of loans available to a debtor country 
precisely because these variables increase the effectiveness of a penalty 
for default. They also show that an increase in the stock of debt a 
country owes increases the probability that it is in a supply-constrained 
regime. 
Most analysts have approached the problem of debt-rescheduling 
from the perspective of the debtor country, although a few studies have 
examined it from the perspective of the creditor. Since most creditors are 
commercial banks in developed countries, this type of analysis has 
focused on the evaluation of such firms; in particular, how their market 
value is related to their holdings ofdebt in less developed countries. Two 
examples of this approach are Bruner and Simms (1987) and Musumeci 
and Sinkey (1990). Musumeci and Sinkey analyze the effects of the 
announcement of Brazil's 'open-ended' debt moratorium, reported in 
The Wall Street Journal on 23 February 1987. They examined how the 
values ofthe equity ofa sample ofbank holding companies in the United 
States were affected by the announcement. They found that it had a 
significantly negative effect on the stock prices of these holding 
companies, and moreover, the size of the effect was significantly related 
to the size of their Brazilian exposures. 
Although direct tests on bank equity value may seem appealing 
because of the wide availability ofdata, they may be very inefficient since 
many other factors influence equity value. Secondary-market price data 
for country debt offers an alternative data source from creditor countries 
with great potential value for the study of rescheduling. If rescheduling 
represents the only significant credit risk associated with country loans, 
such price data should be able to give strong inferences about the 
probability of future reschedulings. If time-series data are available, 
price changes can be related to measures of the economic and political 
environment in the debtor countries. Such data may be particularly 
useful in understanding the short-run dynamics associated with 
rescheduling. This is an open area of research. 
DISCUSSION OF THE DATA 
Surprisingly, it is difficult to get a complete list of all the debt­
reschedulings that have taken place over the past three decades. Indeed, 
most of the studies cited above used their own idiosyncratic sources for 
reschedulings. The primary difficulty stems from a lack of agreement as 
to what constitutes a rescheduling. Fixing the precise timing of a 
rescheduling is even more problematic. Often a country misses a 
scheduled payment and then begins a process ofrenegotiation. The final 
agreement on rescheduling is typically reached many months after the 
first payment is missed, and this process may cover two calendar years. 
The best single current source for debt-reschedulings is the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development's World Debt 
Tables. These are published annually, and the recent issues contain 
exhaustive lists of the debt-reschedulings that occurred in the last 
decade. These publications also contain convenient macro-economic 
data relevant to research in this area; they are available at an annual 
frequency. The most important data that are presented are the stocks of 
foreign debt owed by the less developed countries. Another good source 
for a list of reschedulings between 1976 and 1987 is Keller and 
Weerasinghe (1988). They discuss the recent experiences with 
rescheduling with a primary focus on the negotiations within the Paris 
Club of the creditor countries. 
The International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics 
is another standard source for macro-economic data in a unified format 
for the member countries of the Fund. These data are available at both 
quarterly and annual frequencies. These data are available on tape at 
many universities and other research institutions, and they are relatively 
easy to retrieve. 
Most studies on debt-rescheduling have used country-years as the 
fundamental unit of analysis. Although most relevant variables are 
available on a quarterly basis, the crucial foreign-debt data will typically 
be reported with a lag which varies from country to country. It might be 
possible to obtain data with a better alignment from the creditor 
countries; however, such data have typically not been made public. 
Analysis with monthly or weekly data is even more problematic. Very 
few macro-economic statistics are available at a higher than quarterly 
frequency; this is especially true of data from the less developed 
countries. There are monthly series on industrial production, interest 
rates, exchange rates, prices, and the merchandise-trade balance for 
several less developed countries, but this is the exception rather than the 
rule. The fact that there is a lag between the shipment of exports from a 
foreign country and the month they are eventually reported makes the 
use of monthly trade statistics highly problematic. 
STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES 
A variety of statistical methods were employed to estimate models of 
debt-rescheduling in the studies cited above. Since most authors chose 
their dependent variable to be a discrete binary variable which took on 
the value one when a country 'rescheduled' within a given time-period 
and zero otherwise, the statistical methods used have been those 
designed for dichotomous dependent variables. These methods include 
discriminant-analysis, linear-probability, probit, and logit models. In 
this section we briefly describe each of these methods and then discuss 
criteria to use when choosing among them. Perforce, our discussion will 
be brief. Those wanting more detail can refer to Altman et al. (1981), 
Maddala (1983), Amemiya (1985) or other similar sources. 
Linear-probability model 
Although the linear-probability model has generally not been used for 
the study of debt refinancing, I it is one of the more popular methods of 
modeling dichotomous dependent variables. The mociel is defined as 
follows. Assume that observations are country-years, and consider the 
i-th observation. Then the dependent variable, yj, is given by 
if rescheduling occurs 
y, ~ {: 
otherwise. 
Furthermore, let the conditional probability that Yi equal one be linear in 
X;, a K x I vector of independent variables. This implies that 
Probability (Yi = I) = Pi = Xj'~, 
where ~  is a K x I vector of coefficients. It can be shown that the 
assumption that the probability is linear implies that the expression 
Yi = X;'~  + Cj, 
where Cj is a random error term, meets all of the assumptions of the 
classical linear-regression model. Thus Yi can be simply regressed against 
Xi using a standard regression package, with the estimated coefficients 
being consistent and unbiased estimates of~  in the probability equation. 
Although coefficients will be consistent and unbiased, several practical 
problems arise with the use of standard regression estimates of the 
linear-probability-model coefficients. First, because the dependent 
variable is dichotomous, the error terms, Ci' will not satisfy the 
assumption of equal variance. This means that the standard errors and 
t-statistics reported from a standard regression program will be biased. 
The standard way of dealing with error terms with different variances is 
to use weighted least squares. It can be shown that if each observation is 
weighted by the term 
I / (Xi'~ * (1 - Xi'~))'  
then the standard errors reported from standard regression programs 
will be unbiased and the coefficient estimates will be asymptotically 
efficient. It should be noted, though, that this adjustment requires that ~  
be known. In practice, estimates from an initial unweighted regression 
are used. 
A second problem with regression estimates of the linear-probability 
model is the fact that probability estimates, Pi' can be less than zero or 
greater than one. Several methods have been proposed to deal with this, 
generally involving setting inadmissable probability estimates equal to 
bounds like .98 and .02. 
Logitmodel 
The logit model is very similar to the linear-probability model. Let Yi be 
defined the same as for the linear probability model. If the conditional 
probability that Yi equal one is 
Pi = II (l + exp( - X(~)), 
then the model meets the assumptions of the logistic model. 
Because of its functional form, the logistic model's predictions are 
constrained between zero and one. Moreover, the model shows 
diminishing returns. This means that the partial of the probability with 
respect to each variable in Xi is proportional to Pi * (l - PJ, whereas the 
partial is constant for the linear-probability model. Thus, changes in the 
independent variables will have less and less impact on the probability 
that Yi is one as the probability moves away from one-half. In other 
words, the function's ability to discriminate is most sensitive near its 
midpoint. 
Although the logistic model employs what many analysts believe are 
more realistic assumptions than the linear-probability model, one major 
cost is that the model cannot be estimated using a standard regression 
package. Coefficient estimates for models such as those of individual­
country debt reschedulings must be computed using iterative 
techniques, generally maximum-likelihood methods. Although many 
good software programs are available to do this, they can be expensive 
to operate and may require some knowledge of non-linear estimation to 
use. 
Probit model 
The probit model is virtually identical to the logit model; indeed, the 
logistic model was developed historically as an approximation to the 
probit model. Again, defining Yi as in the linear-probability model, if the 
conditional probability that Yi equal one is 
Pi = F(X;'~), 
where FO is the cumulative standard nonnal distribution function, then 
the model meets the assumptions of the probit model. 
Like the logit model, the probit model shows diminishing returns with 
partials proportional to f(X;'~),  where f(·) is the standard nonnal density 
function. Similarly, coefficients must be computed using non-linear 
iterative methods. However, the probit model is scaled somewhat 
differently than the logit. Typically, the logistic-model coefficients will be 
1.8 times as large as those of the probit model. However, t-statistics of 
the coefficients and probability predictions for specific observations are 
likely to be very similar. 
Discriminant analysis 
The linear-probability, logit, and probit models evolved from the 
traditional regression model. The most popular method used for 
modeling debt-rescheduling, discriminant analysis, evolved from a 
different tradition, that of analysis of variance. Instead of a dependent 
variable, Yi' caused by Xi'S, two groups of country-years are assumed: 
years in which a country reschedules its debt; and years in which a 
country does not reschedule. Each country-year observation, i, is 
assumed to be characterized by measurements on a set of independent 
variables, Xi' The crucial additional assumption is that, within each 
group, the X variables are distributed according to a Multivariate 
Normal Distribution: 
Xi '" N(IlI' 1:\) if observation i is in the rescheduled group, 
X;' '" N(1l2' 1:2) if observation i' is in the non-rescheduled group, 
where III and 112 are K x 1group mean vectors, and 1:1 and 1:2 are K x K 
group covariance matrices. 
Unlike the early probability models, the causal flow is assumed to be 
from group membership to the Xi'S. Thus membership is detennined 
first, and this determines the values of the Xi'S. The concept ofprediction 
is also different from those of the techniques presented earlier. We do not 
try to predict rescheduling on the basis of the values of the Xi'S, but 
rather we try to infer to which group a country-year observation belongs 
on the basis of its Xi values. This is akin to fonning a posterior 
probability in classical Bayesian analysis. 
Another difference between discriminant analysis and the techniques 
presented earlier is that there are no real parameters to estimate in 
discriminant analysis. Instead, analysis generally consists of two 
procedures: first, testing whether the two groups have the same mean 
vectors, i.e. 111= I1z; and second, constructing an expression for the 
posterior probability for a random country-year observation. Each of 
these procedures requires knowledge of the mean vector and covariance 
matrix for each group. Generally these are estimated using the sample 
means and covariances. 
Tests for the difference in the means depend upon whether or not the 
two group covariances are assumed equal. If the covariance matrices are 
equal, then, under the null hypothesis ofgroup mean vector equality, the 
expression 
N I + N z - K - I NI*Nz 
(XI - Xz)' 8- 1 (XI - X 2) * * - * ---­
N I + N z - 2 K N I + N z 
is distributed as an F statistic with K and N I + N z - K - I degrees of 
freedom. Here N 1 and N z are the number of observations in groups one 
and two respectively, XI and X z are the respective group-sample mean 
vectors, and 8 is the sample within-group covariance matrix. There are 
similar, but more complicated tests when group covariances are not 
assumed to be equal (see Altman et al. 1981). 
The posterior probabilities for a random country-year i are derived 
from the likelihood expressions for each group. Define 
f li = (1/(2 1t I ~I  I) liZ) exp[ - (Xi - 11 I)' ~I  -I (Xi - 11 1)/2], and 
fZi = (I/(21t I ~zl)  1/2) exp[ -(Xi - I1z)' ~z-I (Xi - I1z)/2]. 
If QI and Qz are the relative sizes of the rescheduled group and non­
rescheduled group respectively, then the posterior probability that a 
random country-year with values Xi was drawn from the rescheduled 
group is 
QI * f liProbability (Xi is in group one) = 
QI * f li + Qz * fZi 
The probability that Xi is in group two is defined similarly. This is often 
referred to as 'quadratic classification' since it does not assume that the 
two groups have the same covariance matrix. If we assume that the two 
groups have the same covariance matrix, then the probability that a 
random country-year comes from the rescheduled group reduces to 
Probability (Xi is in group one) = I /[1 + (Qz/Q,) exp( - Xi'P + ex)], 
where P= ~ -I (11 I - I1z), ex = (11 I + 112)'13 /2, and ~ is the population 
within-group covariance matrix. The vector 13 is often referred to as the 
'linear discriminant function', and classification using this formula is 
referred to as 'linear classification'. In practice, the function is formed 
using sample group mean vectors XI and X 2 and the sample within­
group covariance matrix S. 
MODEL SELECTION 
The similarity ofthe regression, logit, probit, and discriminant-analysis 
models we have presented in this section raises the question as to how the 
choice of model should be made. Although some authors have argued 
otherwise, there is nothing that should categorically exclude any of the 
models from consideration. A case could bemade for each of the models 
we have presented on the grounds of computational ease, theoretical 
structure, or functional flexibility. Indeed, there are conditions where 
data can be consistently described by more than one model. 
Although the choice of model will often not greatly affect the 
implications ofa study, there are a number ofconsiderations that can be 
used in making this choice. These range from the researcher's beliefs as 
to the theoretical causal structure of the process being modeled to the 
'fit' ofeach potential model with actual data. Moreover, there are several 
different ways to measure fit. Model fit can be judged by how well the 
model correctly classifies historical country-year observations. The 
criterion offit is measured by how often the predicted 'most likely' group 
or choice actually occurs. Alternatively, model fit can be measured by 
how accurately predicted probabilities reflect observed group 
frequencies. 
If the first method is used, the misclassification rates ofmodels can be 
compared and used to select the best model. Thus, for example, if a 
discriminant-analysis model predicted better than a logit model, then 
the former model would be chosen. Although this is an attractive 
mechanism for model selection, several words of caution should 
accompany its use. 
First, there is a question ofwhich sample to use. If the original sample 
used to estimate parameters is used, misclassification rates will be biased 
in small samples. Alternatively, another or 'holdout' sample could be 
used. This yields unbiased estimates ofmisclassification rates; however, 
it has the disadvantage of requiring large samples and not using all the 
data to estimate the model. Note that misclassification estimates 
constructed from either original or holdout samples may be poor 
indicators of how the model would work prospectively, particularly if 
structural changes occur. 
A second concern with using misclassification rates as a measure of 
goodness of fit is that it weighs both misclassifications equally. Clearly, 
saying that a country will reschedule, when it does not, may not be as 
serious an error as saying it will not, when it does. Finally, perhaps the 
most serious flaw with using misclassification rates to choose among 
models is that it is sensitive only to observations with probabilities near 
the one-half threshold. Since rescheduling is a rare event, the evidence of 
a good model will not be that it predicts rescheduling with probabilities 
of one-half or more; rather, a good model predicts rescheduling with 
higher probabilities for countries in the years that they do reschedule 
than in years they do not. 
The inadequacies of the misclassification-rate criterion have led to 
alternative measures of model fit that take into account the predicted 
group or choice probabilities, not just 'most likely' predictions. One 
suggested approach is to compare the average predicted probabilities for 
each group. For example, the mean predicted failure probability for 
known reschedulings could be compared to the mean probability for 
non-rescheduled observations. The wider the difference, the better the 
model. Another similar approach is to rank observations by predicted 
probabilities and compare the actual rescheduling rates of, say, the 
lowest decile to the next lowest, and so on. Both of these approaches are 
primarily descriptive. Other, more objective criteria have been proposed 
that are variations of the regression multiple-correlation coefficient R2 
(see McFadden 1976). 
An attractive feature of these R2 measures of goodness of fit is that 
they can be used to compare the performance of different model forms 
on the same data. If, for example, the logit model appeared to have a 
significantly better fit than the discriminant-analysis model, it would 
offer a persuasive argument to adopt the logit-model form. However, 
these statistics should not be used blindly. It is quite possible for 'wrong' 
models to perform better in particular small samples, even though in an 
infinite-sized sample they would not. The predictions of a particular 
model are quite sensitive to the distribution of the independent 
variables. Thus the policy analyst should be wary of changing models 
simply in order to fit better a new sample of data. 
Thus far we have focused on measures of how different models fit 
actual data. Often, however, researchers may have to make model 
decisions before examining data. It may also be desirable to have the 
model decision guided by theoretical rather than empirical 
considerations and to choose the model form most consistent with the 
structure of the problem being modeled. We now focus on the problem 
of model selection on theoretical grounds. We will consider arguments 
for and against the linear probability, probit, logit, and discriminant­
analysis models. 

 
To begin with, there is nothing inherently wrong with any of the 
models we have presented. Each rests on sound statistical grounds and 
under appropriate assumptions can be properly used to model any 
categorical dependent variable problem. Statements such as 'it is 
improper to use a linear-regression model with a dichotomous 
dependent variable' or 'discriminant analysis cannot be used if groups 
are ranked' are dangerous and inaccurate generalizations. However, 
each of the models rests on different distributional and, to some extent, 
structural assumptions. Thus, for a given problem it may be that the 
assumptions required for one model are more appropriate than those of 
other models and therefore argue for the model's use. The researcher's 
goal is to match the assumptions to the problem. Running the risk of 
violating our own caveat about generalizations, we can use several 
general guides in matching problems and models. 
If the researcher's problem involves measuring the association 
between rescheduling and a group of independent variables, where the 
only goal is to estimate parameters of a forecasting function for 
reschedulings, then theoretical considerations should not preclude any 
model. The regression, probit, logit, and discriminant-analysis models 
merely represent different prediction functions. Model selection in these 
circumstances should be based primarily on empirical fit and statistical 
considerations. Robustness, computing costs and sampling concerns 
may also be important. For example, most analysts having access to a 
personal computer will be able to estimate linear-probability models 
because regression software is so readily available. Software designed to 
implement logistic models is not as widely available. We caution that 
selecting on the basis of fit limits the ability to draw causal inferences 
from the estimated coefficients and parameters. Itwould be a mistake to 
choose a model because it 'fits well' and then interpret its parameters as 
supportive of a particular hypothesis. 
If the researcher, however, is interested in estimating and perhaps 
testing a causal model, it may appear that there are strong theoretical 
reasons for choosing one of the three probabilistic-choice models. It 
appears that a particularly good argument can be made for probit and 
logit models in this case, since a number ofauthors have shown that both 
models can be derived from utility-maximizing behavior. However, it 
can be shown that the linear-probability model can also be derived from 
utility-maximizing behavior with a slightly different assumption about 
the error terms. Moreover, McFadden (1976) shows that a case can be 
made for the discriminant-analysis model, even if the independent 
variables are assumed to cause rescheduling. He shows that, if 
appropriate distributional assumptions are made, then discriminant 
analysis will provide consistent estimates of the parameters of an 
underlying causal process running from the independent variables to the 
rescheduling decision. He does voice concern, though that this 
justification of the discriminant analysis is not very robust with respect 
to assumptions. 
THE DECISION TO RESCHEDULE AS A DYNAMIC PROGRAM 
The decision to reschedule a country's debt occurs in time. It is also a 
decision that is taken under uncertainty. Both of these facts make it 
attractive to model the phenomenon ofdebt-rescheduling as a stochastic 
dynamic program. This is an avenue of research that has not yet been 
pursued very far in the empirical literature. In this section, we will build 
upon the seminal work of Rust (1987) in describing how one might 
estimate a dynamic program describing a country's decision to 
reschedule debt. 
Consider a debtor country making the decision to reschedule its 
stream ofdebt service. Itmust decide whether to service its debt this year 
or to seek rescheduling. This entails deferring some payment now for the 
possibility of a stream of higher payments in the future. The decision 
depends upon the trade-offbetween the current benefits ofmaintaining a 
payments schedule versus the potentially uncertain future costs of 
repayment entailed by a rescheduling agreement. 
Consider a given debtor country. Let y, be the real gross national 
product of this country in year t, and let Dt be the real stock of 
outstanding sovereign debt in year t. Then we can impute the real debt­
service burden at time t as 
dt = rtDt, 
where d t is the flow payment for debt service and r t is the real interest rate 
facing the country in year t. Even though inflation expectations are not 
observable, it is convenient here to assume that the real interest rate is 
observable; this point will become clearer below. Now we can define the 
state of the system at time t as the 2 x I vector 
Xl = (Yt, dY· 
The policy-maker's decision is whether to reschedule foreign debt, 
conditional upon this year's realization of real gross national product 
and the real debt service. We shall assume that the policy-maker is 
concerned about the total consumption available to the economy. In 
particular, we write: 
ct = Yt + b l - dt, 
where Ct is national consumption and bt is new borrowing at time t. In 
year t, the policy-maker must choose one of two options. We shall model 
this as a choice it E{O, I}, where 0 is the decision to maintain a payment 
schedule and I is the decision to reschedule. The set {O, I} is the set of 
controls available to the policy-maker at time t. Notice that this set is 
independent of the state; this is a convenient simplification and it suits 
our problem well. If the policy-maker chooses to reschedule, national 
consumption is Yt - P, where P is a penalty. Otherwise, consumption is as 
above. If the policy-maker has constant relative risk aversion, the 
reward function is 
f(Yt - P) + Et(l) ifit = I 
u(xt, it, "I) + Elit) = { f(Yt + bt - dJ + Et(O) ifi, = 0 
where f(ct) = d,-<I/(I - "I)' and Et(it) is the error term associated with 
choice it. 
The term~  (it) is known to the policy-maker, butitis not observable to 
the econometrician. A large realization of Et(l) might be interpreted as 
the policy-maker's perception that the penalty from rescheduling is less 
burdensome than P, and a small realization of Et(l) reflects the policy­
maker's belief that the penalty from rescheduling is actually more 
onerous than P. We may state analogously that a large value of Et(O) is 
the perception that continued unencumbered access to international 
credit markets is quite valuable, whereas a small realization of ElO) 
reflects the notion that the policy-maker places little value on free trade. 
These error terms make the problem of debt-rescheduling a truly 
stochastic one. Without the errors, the solution to a control problem of 
this type with only two variables would be simple and consist only of 
finding the threshold level of gross national product above which the 
country would not seek rescheduling. Such a simple rule is belied by the 
data. It is traditional to assume that {Et(O), Et(l)} are independently and 
identically distributed and that they follow a multivariate extreme-value 
process. This implies that the choice of whether to reschedule in state XI 
can be described by a logistic function; such a function is practical in the 
estimation of the model. 
It is necessary to specify the transition function in order to complete 
the description ofthe dynamic program. This function describes how the 
state evolves from year to year. We can write 
(g(YI' "2)' dt) if it = I 
h(xt+1I Xt, it, "2) = { (g(Yt, "2), dl + btrt) ifi, = 0 
where the function g(Yt, 'tz) describes the distribution ofnext year's gross 
national product conditional upon this year's Yt' The parameter 'tz 
captures the natural rate of growth ofthe economy. Although Yt+1 is a 
realization from the continuous distribution g(Yt, 'tz), it is typical in 
practical problems to make the state space discrete. We are assuming 
here that the debtor country's debt service next year does not decrease if 
it seeks rescheduling this year, and we have allowed next year's debt 
service ofa country in compliance with its agreements to increase by the 
debt service on new borrowings. 
We are now in a position to describe the policy-maker's dynamic 
program fully. An optimal policy for rescheduling is one that maximizes 
V(xt I 't) = u(xt, it, 'tJ + Et(it) + ~ E{V(xt+l , i I 't)} 
where't = ('til 'tz) is the vector of parameters to be estimated and the 
expectation ofV(xt+1 I 't) is taken with respect to the joint distribution of 
Xt+1 and Et+l • Knowing the current value of gross national product and 
the current realizations of Et, the policy-maker forecasts the future path 
ofnational product and then decides whether to seek rescheduling in this 
period. 
The assumption that the policy-maker's private information follows 
an extreme-value process allows us to write the probability of 
rescheduling (i = I) or not rescheduling (i = 0) as 
. exp{u(x,i,'t l ) + ~ E V (x,i,'t)} Prob(ll x, 't) =-----------------­
exp{u(x,O,'tI)+ ~  E V(X,O,'t)} + exp{u(x, I ,'t l ) + ~ E V(X, I ,'t)} 
which is identical to Rust's (1987) formula (4.13). This states that the 
policy-maker's probability ofchoosing to reschedule can be represented 
as a non-linear function ofhis degree ofrisk aversion, given the expected 
costs of rescheduling. 
In order to make the estimation of't feasible, it is necessary to assume 
that Xt and Et are conditionally independent. First, the econometrician 
assumes that the distribution of Xt+1 depends only on Xt, not on Et; this 
states that the distribution of next year's gross national product is 
independent of the policy-maker's private information. Second, the 
econometrician assumes that any dependence between Et+1 and Et is 
transmitted through the state variable Xt; this implies that next year's 
gross national product is a sufficient statistic for next year's realization of 
the policy-maker's private information. 
The estimation of 't can be accomplished in two steps. The first 
consists of determining the probability distribution of Xt conditional 
upon Xt-I' Although both gross national product and debt service are 
continuous variables, it is necessary to use discrete approximations of 
them. For a given country, the econometrician chooses levels of gross 
national product that correspond to relevant stages in the growth 
process. Then the estimate of 't2 is a Markovian transition probability 
corresponding to the likelihood of moving from one level of growth to 
another.2 This transition probability is conditional upon the observed 
level of debt service. 
The second step consists of estimating the parameter 't], representing 
the policy-maker's degree of risk aversion. This involves estimating the 
choice probabilities described in the logistic formula given above. This 
step requires the use ofa nested fixed-point algorithm. For a given value 
of 't], it is necessary to calculate the entire value funCtion defined on a 
discrete state space. Then the nested fixed-point algorithm3 searches for 
the value of't] that maximizes the product 
T 
II Prob(it I Xt, 't)
 
t= 1
 
where these probabilities are defined above. Rust (1985) has developed 
an efficient algorithm for implementing this step on a personal computer. 
This technique can be implemented for a given country or for a set of 
different countries. It will estimate jointly a country's natural rate of 
growth and the degree of risk aversion of its policy-makers - infor­
mation which would be of tremendous use to lending institutions in 
creditor countries. The primary advantage of using the technique of 
dynamic programming is that it captures the essence of the decision a 
country makes in deciding to reschedule and puts it in its proper 
intertemporal setting. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Several points of conclusion can be drawn from this chapter. First, 
despite the fact that a number of good theoretical models of country 
debt-rescheduling have appeared in the literature, virtually all the 
empirical studies have been primarily descriptive. These studies have 
focused on macro-economic variables related to a country's ability to 
sustain debt-service payments. Some of the most important of these 
variables are the openness of the debtor country's economy, the ratio of 
debt-service payments relative to export revenues, and measures of 
economic growth. These data typically appear at an annual frequency. 
Further, several authors have noted that the definition of an episode of 
rescheduling can be problematic. Hence, the unit of analysis has almost 
uniformly been a country-year. 
Second, although several authors have advocated particular 
statistical techniques, there appears to be little justification for choosing 
one technique over another. Both discriminant-analysis and logistic 
models have been used in the literature, and, because ofthe dichotomous 
nature of the debt-rescheduling variable, probit and linear-probability 
models could also be used. Little guidance has emerged from the 
theoretical literature on debt-rescheduling on the error-distributional 
assumptions needed to select among these techniques. Thus a strong 
case could be made for selecting a model form on the basis of sample fit. 
However, because the probability of a rescheduling is low, the 
predictions from all of these models are likely to be very similar. 
Therefore, model selection could very well be made on the basis of 
technical concerns such as the availability of software. 
Third, new econometric techniques based upon dynamic pro­
gramming have a ready application to issues ofdebt-rescheduling. These 
techniques have been used before in studying patent renewals and bus­
engine replacement, and they are beginning to be used in many other 
applied fields in economics. New software has been developed to 
implement solution algorithms for these models on the personal 
computer. Data on reschedulings and the economies of the debtor 
countries are rich enough so that it is practicable to these kinds of 
models. Indeed, the extension of applications of dynamic programming 
to forecasting debt-rescheduling seems quite promising. 
NOTES 
1 A notable exception is Solberg (1988).
 
2 See Feller (1950) for a discussion of Markov models.
 
3 See Rust (1987) for a description of this procedure.
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